Oblivious transfer (OT) is a protocol where a receiver can obtain t-out-of-n services from the sender without releasing anything about his choices. OT can be used to protect user's privacy. In principle, any user can interact with a server to request some services. This might allow some undesirable users to obtain services from the server. How to ensure that only the authorized receivers can obtain services obliviously is a daunting task. In this paper, we introduce oblivious signature based-on envelope (OSBE) to OT and propose two novel OT schemes, which only allow the legitimate receivers to obtain services obliviously. The receiver is required to authenticate himself to the issuer to possess the required credential prior to access the protected services; while no authentication from the sender needs to be done. The sender knows the number of the services selected by the receiver, but does not know anything about his choices and personally identifiable information. The feature of our scheme also lies in avoiding zero knowledge proofs and achieving all-ornothing non-transferable credentials. Our schemes are efficient in the cost of communication and computation. 
Introduction
Although the Internet has brought enormous benefits to people, security and privacy problems have been a major concern to the users. Internet users are concerned with their privacy, and require their personally identifiable information (PII) not to be collected, pilfered and illegally used. Although users believe that a small part of PII is insufficient for identifying the real identity, the malicious attackers can aggregate the collected partial PII, such as health condition, financial data and hobbies, to analyze and trace the real user. Lessons from identity theft, identity fraud, fictitious identity etc. suggest that PII should be released under the user's control in the critical moment.
Obviously, there is a trade-off between the accountability and privacy. How to balance them is a challenging problem. There have been some attempts toward a solution, such as identity management 1,2 , user-centric system 3,4,5 , privacy-preserving systems 6, 7 , anonymous credential 8,9,10,11,12,13,14 , hidden credentials 15 , k-time anonymous authentication 16, 17, 18, 19 . These systems addressed the security of the user's PII so that the user cannot be impersonated. In practice, the adversary can trace and identify a user not only by the PII, but also by his activities, such as the websites he visited frequently, the goods he purchased online. Therefore, in order to protect users' privacy, we need a new system that captures the security of both PII and services selected by a user. The following properties should be considered:
1. Only the authorized users can access the protected services. 2. The service providers should not know anything about the user's PII. 3 . The service providers should not know anything about the contents of the services the user selected.
Suppose there exists a third trusted party (TTP) called the issuer, who is trusted by all participants in the system. Prior to accessing the services, the user needs to authenticate himself to the issuer and obtain the required credentials. The user can use these credentials to access the protected services, without revealing any information about his choice and PII to the service providers. Such a system can be used in some practical scenarios. For example, in the library database system, the user registers himself to the manager and then obtains a permission to access the database system. The database will record the number of the items he accessed, without knowing anything about the contents of the selected items. The library can charge the user according to the number recorded by the database. Both the PII and the selected services are not disseminated to the database. Therefore, this system can resist against a malicious database that analyzes the user from the partial PII and services. Other applications of this system can be found in the sensitive information system, where only the qualified people can access the protected services, such as patent search, DNA databases and multi-party computations.
Proposed by Rabin in 1981 20 , and extended by Brassaard, Crépeau and Robert in 1987 21 , k-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT n k ) is a cryptographic primitive, where the sender and the receiver have messages M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M n and choices σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ t ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, respectively. After a transfer, the receiver obtains messages M σ 1 , M σ 2 , · · · , M σt , while the sender can not know anything about the receiver's choices. Adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious transfer (OT n k×1 ), proposed by Naor and Pinkas 22, 23 , allows the receiver to obtain services from the sender one by one adaptively, namely the i-th choice may depend on the first i − 1 choices. Therefore, adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious transfer can provide stronger security than k-out-of-n oblivious transfer.
A drawback of OT n k×1 is that there is no limitation on the user; namely any one can interact with and receive services from the server obliviously. There exist some attempts to prevent an illegal receiver from accessing the protected services. Aiello, Ishai, and Reingold proposed a priced oblivious transfer based on homographic encryption and private information retrieval (PIR) 24 , where only if the price of the selected service is less than the remaining balance, then the receiver can obtain the service from the sender obliviously. Otherwise, the selected service will be denied. Subseqently, Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Rajagopalan 25 proposed a conditional oblivious transfer scheme where the receiver can access the protected service if and only if his secret key satisfies the public predicate. Unfortunately, the privacy of users was not considered in these schemes.
Recently, Coull, Green and Hohenberger proposed an oblivious transfer with access control using state graphs 26 . In this scheme, the receiver's state shifts from one to another after each transition. If all states are used, the receiver cannot access the protected services any longer. Camenisch, Dubovitskaya and Neven proposed another oblivious transfer with access control 27, 28 , which is more efficient than the former. All these schemes work as follows:
2. The receiver proves that he has possessed the required credentials to the sender in zero knowledge. 3. The receiver and the sender execute an oblivious transfer 29 to obtain the intended services.
In these schemes, the user needs to authenticate himself to the issuer and obtain credentials. Then, the receiver proves that he is an authorized receiver to the sender in zero knowledge. Since the receiver needs to authenticate himself two times, the cost of computation and communication is expensive. Recently, Camenisch, Dubovitskaya, Neven and Zaverucha proposed a new oblivious transfer with access control scheme where a user can only knows whether he is granted to access the service items and dose not know anything about the access control policies 30 . Proposed by Li, Du and Boneh 31 , oblivious signature-based envelope (OSBE) is a cryptographic primitive, where the receiver can obtain the secret encapsulated in the envelop by the sender if and only if he has possessed a signature from the issuer on the public message. Additionally, the receiver is not required to authenticate himself to the sender. The sender cannot distinguish the receivers who have possessed credentials from the receivers who has not possessed credentials. Therefore, the signature is a hidden credential 151 . OSBE has been used in automated trust negotiation (ATN) 34 , secure function evaluation (SFE), secret handshakes 35 . Notably, the sender in OSBE cannot control the interaction. The reason is that the sender encrypts the secret only under the parameters obtained from the issuer, instead of using his own private key.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two novel efficient oblivious transfer schemes with access control. In our schemes, only the authorized user (receiver) can obtain services from the server obliviously. The server knows how many items the authorized user can obtain but it knows nothing about the contents of the selected items. Additionally, the receiver is not required to authenticate himself to the server. Therefore, the user releases nothing about his PII to the server. Our schemes do not require any zero knowledge proof, and hence, our scheme is more efficient than other schemes. We propose the extended chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption, which extends the chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption, and prove that these two assumptions are equivalent.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, preliminaries required throughout this paper are described. In Section 3, two efficient oblivious transfer with access control schemes are proposed and proven. The complexity of the proposed schemes is analyzed. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the definition and security model of oblivious transfer with access control and introduce the related assumptions. Based on the chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption, we propose the extended CT-CDH (XCT-CDH) assumption, and prove that they are equivalent.
Unless noted otherwise, in the rest of this paper, by ω R ← Ω, we denote that ω is chosen at random from Ω. Especially, if Ω is a finite set, ω R ← Ω denotes that ω is chosen uniformly from Ω. By R Υ → S and R Υ ← S, we denote that party R sends Υ to party S, and party S sends Υ to party R, respectively. By y ← A(x), we denote that y is obtained by running algorithm A on input x. We say that a function : Z → R is a negligible function, if for all c ∈ Z there exists a n ∈ Z such that | (x)| < 1 x c for all x > n. By k, we denote a security parameter. We denote KG(1 k ) as a key generator which takes as input k and outputs a secret-public key pair.
Definition and Security Model
There are three entities in an oblivious transfer with access control (OTAC) scheme: issuer I, sender S and receiver R. The issuer authenticates the receivers, and issues credentials to them. The senders send the selected services to the receivers. The receivers interact with the issuer and senders to obtain the required credentials and intended services. There are four algorithms in an oblivious transfer with access control scheme:
• Setup. Taking as input the security parameter k, this algorithm responds with the system public parameters P P . The issuer generates his secret-public key pair (isk, ipk) ← KG(1 k ). The sender generates his secret-public key pair (ssk, spk) ← KG(1 k ).
• Issue. Taking as input the secret key isk, the sender's identifier si and the receiver's identifier ri, it returns a credential to the receiver.
• Commit. Taking as input the secret key ssk and n messages
• Transfer. Taking as input the intended indexes σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ t and the secret key ssk, respectively, the receiver and the sender interact. At the end, the receiver obtains the services M σ 1 , M σ 2 , · · · , M σt , while the sender knows nothing about the receiver's choice.
Correctness: An OTAC scheme is correct if the receiver can obtain his intended messages when the sender and the receiver follow the steps of the scheme.
Security Model. Since the seminal introduction of oblivious transfer, there have been many literatures that discuss its security. The security model of oblivious transfer can be classified into the following types: Honest-but curious model, half-simulation 36 and full-simulation 29, 37 . Proposed by Naro and Pinkas 36 in 2005, the half-simulation is a model where the issues of protecting the receiver and the sender are separated. The security of the receiver requires that two transcripts which the receiver used to obtain services S σ and S σ are indistinguishable from the view of the sender. The security of the sender is defined by comparing the real world and the ideal world experiments. In the real world experiment, the receiver and the sender run the protocol. Meanwhile, in the ideal world experiment, the protocol is implemented by a trusted third party Charlie. For any malicious receiver A in the real world experiment, there exists a malicious receiver A that plays the role of A in the ideal world experiment such that the outputs of A and A are indistinguishable.
We define that an oblivious transfer with access control scheme is secure, if the following properties can be satisfied:
Privacy of the Receiver.
1. The receiver releases nothing about his PII to the sender.
For any two different choice sets
· · · , σ t }, the transcripts received by the sender corresponding to
Especially, the choices of the receiver are unconditionally secure, if the received services
Security of the Sender. Suppose that the receiver has possessed the required credentials from the issuer. To define the security of the sender, we compare the real world and the ideal world paradigms. In the real world, the receiver and the sender execute the protocol. Meanwhile, in the ideal world, the functionality is replaced by a trusted third party (TTP). The sender sends all his messages {M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M n } to the TTP. The receiver sends his choices
receiver. An oblivious transfer with access control can protect the security of the sender, if for any receiver R in real world, there exists an probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) receiver R in the ideal world such that the outputs of R and R are indistinguishable.
Semantic Security. If the receiver has not obtained the required credentials from the issuer, he can obtain nothing about the protected services.
Security Assumptions
Let G 1 , G 2 and G τ be multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p, namely |G 1 | = |G 2 | = |G τ | = p. Let g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 be the generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. A bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G τ satisfies the following properties:
2. No-degeneracy. e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1, where 1 is the identity in G τ .
3.
Computability. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(θ, ϑ),
Let GG(1 k ) be a bilinear group generator that takes as input k and output the description of groups (G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) with prim order p and a bilinear map e :
be a group generator which takes as input k and output the description of group G with prime order p
be a bilinear group. Let g 1 and g 2 be the generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. We say that -SDH assumption holds in
where the probability is over the random choice of x ∈ Z * p and the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 2.
Chosen-target Computational Diffie-Hellman (CT-CDH) Assumption 39 . Let g be a generator of group G ← G(1 k ) with prime order p and
is called the target oracle, which takes as input j ∈ Z p , and responds with g j ∈ G. H G (·) is called the help oracle, which takes as input g j ∈ G, and returns g x j ∈ G. Let Q T and Q H denote the numbers that the two oracles are queried, respectively. CT-CDH assumption holds in G, if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
Intuitively, CT-CDH assumption demonstrates that the adversary can query the help oracle on at most π elements in G, and get back with these elements to the power x. If the orders of these π elements on the generator of G are unknown, the adversary can not compute a new element in G to the power of x, which orders on the generator and the π queried elements are unknown. Based on CT-CDH assumption, we propose the extended CT-CDH (XCT-CDH) assumption. We replace the target oracle in CT-CDH assumption with π + 1 random elements of G. We will proof that the XCT-CD assumption and the CT-CDH assumption are equivalent. 
where a i l ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a π+1 }, for l = 1, 2, · · · , π + 1.
Theorem 1.
Chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption and extended chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption are equivalent.
Proof. Given {g
where
is a cryptographic hash function. On the one hand, if the adversary A can break the CT-CDH assumption, we will show that there exists an algorithm B, who can uses A to break the XCT-CDH assumption. Given {g
help oracle queries, the challenger queries the help oracle H G (·) in the XCT-CDH assumption, and returns g xa i 1 , g xa i 2 , · · · , g xa i Q H , where a it ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a π+1 },
, B can compute
, where H(π + 1) = g i π+1 = g a i π+1 . So, B can break XCT-CDH assumption.
On the other hand, if A can break the XCT-CDH assumption, we will show that there exists an algorithm B, who can use A to break the CT-CDH assumption. When A queries help oracle on {g a i 1 , g a i 2 , · · · , g a iπ }, the challenger queries the help oracle H G (·) in CT-CDH assumption, and gets back with {g
, where H(π + 1) = g i π+1 = g a i π+1 and π + 1 = Q H + 1 > Q H . So, B can break the CT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, the chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (CT-CDH) assumption and the extended chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption are equivalent.
Note that the extended chosen-target computational Diffie-Hellman (XCT-CDH) assumption is computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, if the help oracle H G (·) in XCT-CDH assumption is canceled.
Indistinguishability. We define that two distribution families Ω 1 (k) and Ω 2 (k) are (statistically) indistinguishable, if
Oblivious Transfer with Access Control
In this section, two efficient oblivious transfer with access control schemes are proposed. The first one is very simple, while the credentials of the receiver are transferable. Comparatively, the second one sacrifices a little efficiency, while the credentials of the receiver are all-or-nothing nontransferable, which means that all credentials are shared, if the receiver share one with others 8 .
Overview. Our idea is as follows: at first, the receiver interacts with the issuer to obtain a credential, which is a signature on a public message, for example the identifier of the sender in the trusted circle 2 . Then, the sender commits his services using OSBE under the public message and his private key. Finally, the receiver interacts with the sender, decrypts the ciphertexts using the possessed credential, and obtains the intended services. In our schemes, only the qualified receivers can obtain services from the sender obliviously, while are not required to authenticate (proof) himself to the sender in zero knowledge. Additionally, nothing about the protected services can be released to the illegal receiver, who has not obtained the required credentials from the issuer.
Oblivious Transfer with Access Control-I
Based on the short signature 38 and the oblivious transfer 40 , we proposed an oblivious transfer with access control scheme AC-OT n k×1 -I, where only the receiver who has possessed the required credential can get services from the sender adaptively, without releasing anything about his PII and the contents of the selected service to the sender. The sender knows how many services the receiver can obtain if he has possessed a credential, but knows nothing about the credential of the receiver. AC-OT n k×1 -I is described in Fig. 1 . Issue. The issuer computes σ = g 1 x+r , and sends (σ, r) to the the receiver R. R checks e(σ, yh r )
Theorem 2. AC-OT

?
= e(g, h).
Suppose that S has messages
Commitment Phase. S chooses t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n R ← Z * q , and computes T = yh r and
Transfer Phase.
R chooses s j R
← Z * q , and computes
where i j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} and j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}.
R
and sends D i j to R.
R computes
a r is the identifier of the sender in the trusted circle. Proof. If the receiver R holds a credential (σ, r), he can compute
and
Theorem 3. AC-OT
n k×1 -I is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Proof. For any B i j received by the sender from the receiver, there exists an s w ∈ Z q (w = j) such that
So, from the view of the sender, B i j is computed from C i j ,1 or C iw,1 is identically distributed. AC-OT n k×1 -I is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Theorem 4. AC-OT
n k×1 -I is sender-secure, if the the XCT-CDH assumption holds in G τ .
Proof. For any probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiverR in the real model, we can construct an probabilistic polynomial-time malicious receiverR * in the ideal model such that the outputs ofR andR * are indistinguishable.
1. S sends M 1 , M 2 , · · · , M n to the trusted third party Charlie.
2.R
* sends C * 1 , C * 2 , · · · , C * n to Charlie, where C * i = (C * i 1 , C * i 2 ) R ← G 2 τ , for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
3.R
* monitors the outputs ofR. IfR can compute
WhenR takes as input
, and gets back with
, for w = 1, 2, · · · , k.
IfR can compute
IfR obtains k + 1 messages,R * does not know which k indices are really selected byR. The simulation fails. Otherwise, we will show thatR can get at most k messages under the XCT-CDH assumption. IfR can get k + 1 messages, he can compute E i j , for j = 1, 2, · · · , k + 1. Namely, after receiving (e(g, h)
z . This contradicts to the XCT-CDH assumption. So,R can obtain at most k messages from the sender.
} are identically distributed. Therefore, the outputs ofR andR * are indistinguishable.
Theorem 5. AC-OT
n k×1 -I is semantically secure under the -SDH assumption and XCT-CDH assumption.
Proof. There are two types adversaries:
Type-I: The adversary can compute A i = e(g, h) t i , then he can act as the authorized receiver to interact with the sender.
Type-II: The adversary can compute the decryption key e(g, h)
zt i from C i .
We will show that Type-I adversary can be used to break the -SDH assumption or XCT-CDH assumption and Type-II adversary can be used to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-I: Suppose that A is Type-I adversary.
1. If A can compute the signature (σ, r), then compute A i , B i , and E i , there exists an algorithm B can use A to break the -SDH assumption 3 .
2. If A can not compute σ, he can compute A i from C i,1 = (yh r ) t i . If it is, there exists an algorithm B who can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, C i,1 ) = (e (g, h) x+r )
and e(g, h), the aim of B is to compute e(g, h) , h) t i , B aborts. B can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-II:
Suppose that A is Type-II adversary. If A can compute e(g, h)
zt i from C i,1 , there exists an algorithm B can uses A to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given (e(g, h)
x+r ) t i , and e(g, h) z , the aim of B is to compute (e(g, h) z )
. So B can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, AC-OT n k×1 -I is semantically secure.
Complexity. Suppose that e(g, h) can be pre-computed. In the setup stage, the issuer needs to compute one exponentiation, and send one element in Z q to the sender. The sender needs to compute one exponentiation. In the issue phase, the issuer needs to compute one exponentiation, and send one element in G 1 and one element in Z p to the receiver. The receiver needs to compute one exponentiation and one pairing. In the commitment phase, the sender needs to compute 2n + 1 exponentiations, and send n elements in G 2 and n elements in G τ to the receiver. In the transfer phase, The receiver needs to computes k pairings and 2k exponentiations, and send k elements in G τ to the sender. The sender needs to compute k exponentiations, and sends k elements in G τ to the receiver. The costs of computation and communication in our AC-OT n k×1 -I are listed in TABLE 1 and TABLE 2, respectively. By e and p, we denote one exponentiation and one paring computing, respectively. By E 1 , E τ and E q , we denote one element in G 1 , G τ and G q , respectively.
Oblivious Transfer with Access Control-II
Based on the signature 17 4 , and the oblivious transfer 40 , we propose an oblivious transfer with access control AC-OT n k×1 -II, where only the authorized receivers can obtain services from the sender adaptively. The sender knows the number of the services the receiver can obtain if he has been authorized, but knows nothing about the contents of the selected services. Additionally, the credential of the receiver is all-or-nothing non-transferable. Namely, our scheme captures the following properties:
1. Zero knowledge proof is not required.
2. The receiver is not required to authenticate himself to the sender.
3. The sender knows the number of the services that can be obtained by the authorized receiver, and nothing about the contents of the selected services.
4. The receiver can not share his credentials with others.
AC-OT
n k×1 -II is described in Fig 2. Theorem 6. AC-OT n k×1 -II is correct.
Proof. If the receiver R has obtained a credential (σ, s, r), he can compute
Setup. Taking as input a security parameter λ, this algorithm outputs a bilinear group (e, G 1 , G 2 , G τ ) ← GG(1 λ ) with prime order q, where e : The issuer selects r R ← Z * q , and sends r to the sender a , where z ≡ x+r (mod q) and x + r ≡ 0, 1 (mod q).
Issue. The issuer chooses s
1 x+r , and sends (σ, r, s) to the receiver R. R checks e(σ, yh r )
, and computes T = yh r and (
1. R chooses s j R ← Z * q , and computes
R
R computes
a r is the identifier of the sender in the trusted circle. 
Theorem 7. AC-OT
n k×1 -II is unconditionally receiver-secure.
Proof. For any B i j received by the sender from the receiver, there exists an
Hence, from the view of the sender, B i j is computed from C i j ,1 or C iu,1 is identically distributed. AC-OT n k×1 -II is unconditionally receiver-secure. Proof. For any probabilistic polynomial-time maliciousR in the real model, we can construct an probabilistic polynomial-time maliciousR * in the ideal model such that the outputs ofR andR * are indistinguishable.
Theorem 8. AC-OT
2.R
* sends C * 1 , C * 2 , · · · , C * n to Charlie, where C * i = (C * i 1 , C * i 2 , C * i 3 , C * i 4 ) R ← G 2 × G 3 τ , for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. 3.R * monitors the outputs ofR. IfR can compute A i 1 , A i 2 , · · · , A i k and B i 1 , B i 2 , · · · , B i k ,R * chooses A * i 1 , A * i 2 , · · · , A * i k and B * i 1 , B * i 2 , · · · , B * i k , where A * iw , B * iw R ← G τ , for w = 1, 2, · · · , k.
WhenR takes as input
, and gets back with D
6.R
IfR obtains k + 1 messages,R * does not know which k indices are really selected byR. The simulation fails. Otherwise, we will show thatR can get at most k messages under the XCT-CDH assumption. IfR can get k + 1 messages, he can compute E i j , for j = 1, 2, · · · , k+1. Namely, after receiving (e(g 0 , h)
z . This contradicts to the XCT-CDH assumption. Hence,R can obtain at most k messages.
Theorem 9. AC-OT
n k×1 -II is semantically secure under the -SDH assumption and XCT-CDH assumption.
Type-I: The adversary can computeÂ i = e(g, h)
t i , then he can act as the authorized receiver to interact with the sender.
Type-II:
The adversary can compute the decryption key e(g, h)
Type-I: Suppose that A is Type-I adversary. zt i from C i,1 , C i,2 , C i,3 , there exists an algorithm B can uses A to break the XCT-CDH assumption as follows: Given e(g, C i,1 ) = (e(g, h)
x+r ) t i , e(g 1 , h) t i , e(g 2 , h) t i and Z = e(g 0 , h) z , the aim of B is to compute (e(g 0 , h) z ) t i . B sends C i = (C i,1 , C i,2 , C i,3 , C i,4 ) to A, if A can compute M i , B aborts. B can compute e(g 0 , h)
. So, B can use A to break the XCT-CDH assumption.
Therefore, AC-OT n k×1 -II is semantically secure.
Complexity. Suppose that e(g 0 , h), e(g 1 , h) and e(g 2 , h) can be pre-computed. In the setup stage, the issuer needs to compute one exponentiation, and send one element in Z q to the sender. The receiver needs to compute one exponentiation. The sender needs to compute one exponentiation. In the issue phase, the issuer needs to compute two exponentiations and send one element in G 1 and two elements in Z q to the receiver. The receiver needs to compute two exponentiations and two parings. In the commitment phase, the sender needs to compute 4n + 1 exponentiations, and send n elements in G 2 and 3n elements in G τ to the receiver. In the transfer phase, The receiver needs to computes k pairings and 4k exponentiations, and send k elements in G τ to the sender. The sender needs to compute k exponentiations, and sends k elements in G τ to the receiver. The costs of computation and communication in our AC-OT n k×1 -II are listed in TABLE 3 and TABLE 4, respectively.
Conclusion
One of the fundamental challenges in open communication channel is to protect user's privacy, including both PII and the selected services. In this paper, we proposed two efficient oblivious transfer with access control schemes. In our schemes, the receiver can obtain services from the sender adaptively if he has been authorized by the issuer. The sender knows the number of the selected items, but nothing about the receiver's choices and his PII. The receiver is required to authenticate himself to the issuer to obtain a credential, and is not required to prove that he is an authorized receiver to the sender. Notably, there is no need of zero knowledge proof. The credentials in the first scheme are transferable, and all-or-nothing non-transferable in the second one. 
